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ARAB ECONOMISTS PESSIMISTIC OVER REGIONAL COOPERATION

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 256, 28 Mar - 4 Apr 82
p 37

/Article by 'Afif al-Zarzar: "Holes in the Arab Reed"/

/Text/ Dr Fakhri Qaduri, secretary general of the United Arab Economic Council issued a warning in Amman that there is an obvious shortening in Arab economic relations. He said that extending the base of Arab interests across public and official channels might help correct these defects.

Dr 'Abu al-Hasan Zalzala, assistant director general for economic affairs at the Arab League said in Beirut last week that after having followed closely the model regional development plans, he began noticing that their direction is taking on regional dimensions rather than national. Thus projects are being completed absent a picture of Arab integrity as so often do Arab industries compete rather than complement one another.

Both men are authorities on Arab economy at the highest levels. This is why they are obliged to paint this "colorful picture" of Arab economic cooperation, in effect to misrepresent the situation; they do not talk about the real economic war which Arabs wage over Arabs, and which is controlled, especially in the Middle East, by very changeable political temperaments.

Both do not talk about the reasons why some Arabs tend to seek non-Arab countries with whom to contract large barter tradings, a result of Arab pressure and Arab boycott which lead to cutting off oil and barring exports. Neither do both talk about assistance being decided for projects whose progress would suddenly halt as assistance becomes cut off; nor do they talk of economic assistance by which decisions are made, but never to become implemented; nor of comprehensive Arab development contracts which turn into secondary insignificant projects to benefit only those politically inclined.

Both men are in high Arab economic positions. The most they can do is to point out the dangers. The truth is being told of both as not having left out even one occasion but have warned of the dangers of the precipitous collapse of the Arab economy, thus leaving a wide opportunity, or rather leaving the doors wide open in the face of continued outside economic interference in the Arab world. They both, however, remain like someone blowing into a holed reed, and there are lots of holes in the Arab reed that leak Arab capabilities out into nothingness.

9770
CSO: 4404/418

FORMATION OF JOINT ARAB AIR FREIGHT COMPANY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 1 Mar 82 p 2

[Article: "The Birth of the First Joint Arab Air Freight Company"]

[Text] The board of directors of the Arab Air Freight Company held its first meeting yesterday at the offices of ALIA, the Royal Jordanian Air Lines. It was attended by Mr Ali Ghandur, chairman of the board and general manager of the company, and by Mr Hashem Hassan al-Majid, general manager of Iraq Air Lines.

At the opening of the meeting, Mr Ghandur welcomed the brother delegation of Iraq and said of this meeting as being historical for it records the birth of the first joint Arab air freight company which we hope would be the first of similar steps to be taken by the airline industry. Mr al-Majid expressed his admiration for this achievement which is leading the two brother countries toward the best possible means of cooperation within the bounds of air freight.

During the meeting, the board of directors discussed the topics listed on the agenda, most important of which were the appointment of a director general and his deputy; debate and adopt an internal disciplinary system for the staff and employees of the company, and talk about membership contributions, both financial and in kind, as stated in the agreement contracted for between the two countries.

The meeting also discussed setting up a work plan for the next phase to include such important items as specifying colors and insignias for the exclusive use of the companies and their planes, and approve specific employment matters for the upcoming phase.

The membership of the board of directors comprises of: Messrs Iyad al-Khalidi, Fahd al-Fanik, Nasri Jami'an, Ghassan 'Ali, Zayd al-Kilani, Jamal Abu Hamdan from the Jordanian side. From the Iraqi side, it includes Messrs Nassir al-'Ani, Fu'ad Azar, Mahdi Mashadani, Manhal al-Shaykh Badir and Salah Hussayn.

Noted here is the fact that the company was established last August with an estimated capital of 20 million Jordanian dinars. The company currently has a fleet of Boeing 707's with the hope of adding 747 jumbo jets later on. The

new company will be operating on international air routes extending through the Middle East, Europe, the Far East, Africa, North and South America.

The establishment of this company is regarded as being a good model for Arab cooperation, interaction and partnership and it is hoped that it would prove exemplary for Arab cooperation among brother Arab countries. These joint projects which were initiated in Iraq and Jordan could polarize Arab countries into participation through their national airline associations in order to set up big air freight companies that could have prominent existence on the map of international air transportation and which could stand firm in the face of sharp airline and air transportation competition, based on what we are witnessing in the Arab world from increased political and economic importance.

9770
CSO: 4404/418

BRIEFS

YUGOSLAV EXPORTS TO ARABS--It was announced in Belgrade that Yugoslave officials are seeking to increase their exports to Arab countries by 25 percent to 30 percent over last year while maintaining their previous level of imports. Yugoslavia exports to the Arab world electronic equipment, motor vehicles, wood and tractors. It imports oil from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Iraq and from Algeria. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 256, 28 Mar - 4 Apr 82 p 21] 9770

CSO: 4404/418

POWERS OF GCC CHAIRMAN DEFINED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 112, 3-9 Apr 82 p 31

[Article by 'Adnan Sadiq: "AL-MAJALLAH Opens an Investigation in the Gulf: What are the Real Powers of the Chairman of the Gulf Cooperation Council?"]

[Text] The outcry provoked by the statements expressed by Mr 'Abdullah Bishara, Chairman of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], in a Kuwaiti television program, raises the question of the powers and responsibilities of the Chairman of the GCC.

In the meeting that took place between Bishara and Dr Muhammad al-Ramihi on the "Gulf Today" program, which is aired weekly by Kuwaiti television, the Chairman of the GCC said that democracy in Kuwait is a kind of luxury. An outcry broke out, and the Kuwaiti National Assembly discussed the issue and issued a proposal signed by the majority of the representatives recommending that the Kuwaiti Government advise Bishara that he resign from his post, after the government informed the National Assembly that it does not have the power to force Bishara to resign, since he has "Gulf," not "Kuwaiti" responsibilities.

What happened in the Kuwaiti National Assembly?

The Kuwaiti Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, Mr 'Abd al-'Aziz Husayn, opened the discussion with an assurance that what Bishara said does not represent the opinion of the government, because the latter is proud of its parliamentary life. He asked the Assembly to consider the particular opinion of Bishara only a personal opinion. Representative Khalifa al-Jari said that the Minister's comment is the best proof that Mr Bishara's statement is in opposition to the country's institutions. Rep Ahmad al-Sa'dun described Bishara's statement as boasting. Representative Jasim al-Saqr described it as far removed from his particular responsibilities due to the sensitivity of his post. And Representative Muhammad al-Murshid said that Bishara's words ridicule the Kuwaiti constitution which, according to the sixth article, ordains democracy. "And if the Assembly were a luxury, it would not have the blessing of the Amir and heir to the throne, and his participation in it."

Representative 'Adnan 'Abd al-Samad said, "Our institutions are constitutional, and they are the only ones that can respond to you, 'Abdallah Bishara." And Representative 'Abd al-Karim al-Hajdali said, "The brethren have given Bishara

more weight than he deserves. Who is 'Abdallah Bishara? He is the stepson of Andrew Young (former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations). 'Adballah Bishara has wounded Kuwait, and the people and Amir of Kuwait."

After the discussion, the Kuwaiti National Assembly proposed that it obtain Bishara's resignation.

The Kuwaiti Government was very embarrassed, one official told AL-MAJALLAH, due to many considerations, especially:

--Bishara is Kuwaiti, and his nomination from the Kuwaiti side, and met with no opposition from any state.

--It is difficult for the Kuwaiti Government, even if it accepted the recommendation of the National Assembly, to ask Bishara to initiate an offer to resign, for two reasons: first, because Bishara's opinion represents the "freedom" spoken of by the National Assembly and its representatives, and because the government does not have the power "and has no desire" to force Bishara to resign. His resignation is subject to the supreme council of the GCC, and not to any Kuwaiti or domestic parliamentary opinion of any state.

--Through Kuwait's contacts with officials in the Gulf states, it has found that there is complete confidence in these states that Bishara is the man for the job, and his resignation is not subject to the opinion of any one side.

--Bishara offered a quasi-apology for his statements when he explained that he had been misunderstood and falsely interpreted, and that the statement represents his personal opinion as a diplomat and citizen of the Gulf, first and foremost, and does not represent any government within the GCC. He confirmed that he did not entirely repsect the democratic institutions in Kuwait.

One question remains: what are the powers and responsibilities of the Chairman of the GCC? Does he have the power to shape the political position of the GCC states? AL-MAJALLAH carried out an investigation of the matter, with the following results:

The first stop was Riyadh. Saudi Arabia's point of view is that the Chairman of the GCC should express the opinion of the Gulf group as long as this is classified under the powers granted to him by virtue of his office. These powers are not written so much as they are the implementation of traditions recognized by the states of the region, which have taken a balanced political line, not aligned with any one side on the international arena. It is likewise not against any side, as long as the statements do not bear on any issues that are essential to the Arab nation, which is the foundation and focus of any joint Arab meeting, or adversely affect the Gulf states' agreement on these issues, heart and soul. It also stands against all sides which oppose these causes and try to support the Zionist enemy. Finally, the Saudi point of view is that the Chairman of the GCC, like any representative of a group of different states which come together in the framework of international organizations, may speak on behalf of the states of the group within the general framework assigned to him. This also does not prevent him from expressing his personal opinions which are not shared by the governments.

The second stop was Kuwait, which had the most sensitivity to the subject and difficulty in answering the question that was raised. But as is evident in the responses of Mr 'Abd al-'Aziz Husayn, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, there is a desire to cross the t's and dot the i's. On the powers of the Chairman of the GCC, the Kuwaiti Minister expressed his confidence in 'Abdallah Bishara as Chairman of the GCC and said, "He is a competent young man with experience and broad knowledge of political issues. He was chosen by the member states by consensus of opinion to assume this office. I believe that when he speaks, he is aware of his responsibilities and his important position." In response to a question on whether the Chairman of the GCC is authorized to speak on behalf of all the member states on political issues on the regional level, Husayn said, "You must ask this question of Bishara himself."

The third stop was the Sultanate of Oman, which was previously critical, in the latter part of last year, of the Chairman's statement when he criticized the United States following the fall of two Libyan planes over the Gulf of Serat. Sources in the Omani foreign minister reaffirmed their previous position and informed AL-MAJALLAH that the Sultanate believes that the Chairman of the GCC is unauthorized to speak on the details of their political position, or to speak in the name of all the member states. These sources emphasized that "every state in the Council has the right to define its own particular position with regard to the issues raised."

The fourth stop was Bahrain. Foreign ministry sources in Manama told AL-MAJALLAH that the subject of the powers of the Chairman has not been discussed since the founding of the GCC. It is also not possible to set specific limits to his powers, and within a particular political context it is not possible to define them. But with regard to the issues on which there is a clear Gulf viewpoint, Bishara may express it, whether on the Arab or the international level, in the name of the Gulf states. In general, the Chairman makes his statements on the basis of the general political climate and whatever indicators he has, according to the nature of the issue that is raised and in light of the general policy of the GCC states."

9397
CSO: 4404/426

WHO CONTROLS REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS BECOMES AN ISSUE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 73, 27 May 82 p 3

[Text] The commander of the revolutionary guards Mohsen Rezai has complained to Khomeyni that he is losing his grip on his armed men because of intrigues by the government and the Majlis to interfere in the internal affairs of the force. During the week ending May 19, Rezai had three meetings with Khomeyni and no fewer than five with Montazeri.

It is not known for sure by IPS sources in Tehran how president ali Khamene'i and Majlis spaker Rafsanjani are trying to meddle in the affairs of the revolutionary guards. Khamene'i has on several occasions said that the paramilitary armed forces must come under the overall command of the revolution's high command and coordinate their work with government. But so far as is known Rafsanjani has on no occasion said anything about the force in public, although he might have expressed his ideas in private.

What is known is that Khomeyni has barred the army from going into politics and has told the Islamic Republican party, which is Khamene'i's power base, not to recruit any military personnel. In other words, Khomeyni has kept politics out of the army.

However, he does not seem to have been able to keep the revolutionary armed gangs away from either meddling in politics or being exploited by politicians. Indeed, the armed revolutionary guards were created to act as guardians of the revolution, and as such they have to be politicised. What seems to be at the root of problems involving the guards is that they are riddled with factionalism and corruption. Those who work as the regime's security force, raiding houses, arresting people and confiscating people's property are now regarded as the gestapo agents of the Khomeyni regime. Many of them are virtual hooligans who have amassed vast fortunes from looting homes and exploiting defenceless members of the public. They take bribes, control the illicit trade in alcoholic drinks and other smuggling and operate a vast network of under-the-counter trade in rationed goods. They have accomplices among the mullahs and bazaar merchants.

There is also the problem of some guards owing personal loyalty not to the regime but to their individual commanders. Guards who work as bodyguards for the vast number of influential mullahs, cabinet ministers, Majlis men and other officials have no opportunity to get rich quickly like those who are attached

to committees, so they must be compensated in other ways or else rivalries and jealousy will erupt.

Against this background there are other guards who are sent into action against armed opposition groups or the Iraqis. They are more exposed to danger than those colleagues who stay in towns, either as personal guards of the top people or as members of the revolutionary committees.

It is because of such rivalries and differences in duties that the now-named Sepah Pasdaran (Army of Revolutionary Guards) is riddled with disputes. To original problems must be added the desire of rival politicians to command the loyalty of the guards when the question of Khomeyni's succession leads to an open struggle between contenders for power.

To try to obviate difficulties and to ensure that his choice as successor Montazeri possesses a strong power base of his own, Khomeyni has placed overall management of the guards under his control. But Montazeri has proved unable to command respect and authority. Meanwhile, Khamene'i, who obviously has plans to emerge as the strongman of the regime, is known to be busy building up his network of supporters inside the force.

There must be topics which Rezai might have been taking up with Khomeyni and Montazeri. At the moment it seems likely that if the choosing of Khomeyni's successor develops into a violent contest between rival mullahs, the revolutionary guards could either have the final say or they could break up into factions, with disastrous results.

CSO: 4600/534

OPPOSITION PAPER LIKENS KHOMEYNI'S RULE TO 'STALINISM'

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 25 Apr 82 pp 1-2

[Text] The grave events which have taken place in Iran for the past 2 weeks reveal the disarray among the ruling circles of the Islamic Republic, who are panic-stricken by the approach of two developments: the end of the war and the death of Khomeyni.

1. The End of the War

The war has been won. The Iraqi aggressor was crushed by the Iranian Army at the battle of Dezful. But that army is still in part the army of the shah. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi won his biggest victory posthumously. It was the troops who were armed, organized, and trained by his efforts and on his orders that carried the day: The Pasdarans to all appearances supposedly were unable to face an enemy equipped with more sophisticated weapons. The Paris daily LE MATIN--which is not suspected of sympathy for the monarchy--emphasized this on 13 April 1982 by publishing the statements of an Iranian officer: "If we win this war, it will be partly due to the shah. He hesitated for a long time, that lieutenant colonel, before blurting out this little phrase. He waited until we were almost alone in the bunker where the soldiers would usually gather. But what was he trying to say by recalling Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in this fashion? Simply that the latter, cost what it may, made sure that his army would be the most modern and the most combat-worthy possible."

The Khomeynists are not unaware of this fact. They are afraid that the army, crowned with tremendous prestige, might once and for all put an end to the regime of hatred and blood which they instituted. Now that the Iraqi threat has been removed, they would like to get rid of those glorious soldiers who have become a burden.

2. Khomeyni's Death

Khomeyni is very old. It is said that he is sick. He looks as if he has aged. His end, soon to come, is a possibility which nobody can rule out. But it was in his name that the myth of the Islamic Republic was created. Once he is gone, certain operations will no longer be possible. His spies know that only too well.

This is the explanation for the ignominious police operation launched by Musavi, Khamene'i, the Tudeh, and their clique.

This machination was carried out in three stages:

First stage. Khomeyni prepared the ground after 12 February, the date of the Islamic Republic's anniversary. On the one hand, he violently attacked the religious individuals who are hostile to him. (He had already been accusing them for a long time of heresy and had been demanding their elimination.) On the other hand, parallel to the Defense Ministry, he created a ministry of pasdarans, responsible for all military and paramilitary matters.

Second stage. Qotbzadeh was arrested and implicated Shari'atmadari. The former minister of foreign affairs was accused of having wanted to overthrow Khomeyni with the assistance of two officers and the help of Shari'atmadari.

These undoubtedly were pure and simple inventions. After leaving the government, Qotbzadeh went into business. He was no longer involved in politics. As for the Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, he has been watched under house arrest since the Azerbaijan insurrection broke out in 1979.

Third stage. A formidable propaganda campaign was unleashed against those who allegedly were guilty.

Today, we can observe the most surprising facts which tell us all about the terror which the Khomeynists have instituted. If we are to believe Radio Tehran, the religious circles of Iranian Shiism--especially the teachers at the theological school of Qom, Feizieh--reportedly condemned Shari'atmadari as a traitor to Islam. When we think of Shari'atmadari's immense prestige among the moderate clergy who are the majority at Qom, one can only be confused.

The fact is that all means were good for the Islamic Republic in obtaining its objective, which was "to liquidate" those military and religious elements whom it distrusted. In this entire affair, Qotbzadeh, knowingly or not, played the role of Khomeyni's agent. Through his televised statements, he compromised the army and a portion of the clergy; that is exactly what was expected of him.

The events of Tehran bring back memories to everybody, both Westerners and Easterners; 2 months before Stalin's death, Beria's men carried out massive arrests, not even shying away from the grotesque or from the unlikely. They, too, publicly charged imaginary crimes. Behind the executioners of the Islamic Republic, one can see emerging the shadow of Moscow's torturers.

5058
CSO: 4619/93

FOREIGN MINISTRY DENOUNCES ISRAELI MOVE IN LEBANON

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Jun 82 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN (IRNA) - The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly condemned Sunday's aggression of the Qods occupying regime against Southern Lebanon.

According to the statement of the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued Monday the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran has expressed Iran's full support for the legitimate struggle of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the deprived people of Lebanon.

Reports from Beirut indicated that hundreds of non-military Palestinians and Lebanese citizens have so far been martyred as a result of this Zionist aggression against the residential areas of Southern Lebanon.

This criminal operation came only one day after Saturday's air raid and bombing of the Iraqi Ba'athist regime against the defenceless people of Ilam, Western Iran. As a result of this bombardment more than 40 people were martyred and some 200 others including several small children were wounded in the city center of Ilam where the people were holding demonstration on the occasion of the anniversary of Khordad 15th, June 5th, uprising of the Iranian Muslims against the former regime.

In the statement issued by the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry all the Islamic countries, especially those states of the region which instead of fighting with the Zionist regime were collaborating with the U.S. and Saddam in the fight against the Islamic Revolution, were warned not to provide any opportunity for the Zionist regime to further materialize its devilish objectives.

It also called on those countries to mobilize all their material and human facilities to take practical steps to remove the root of corruption - i.e. the Zionist regime - from the region.

The statement emphasized that sloganeering for an anti-Zionist struggle would be wholly dishonest without taking measures for an overall campaign against U.S. imperialism.

The militant Palestinians and oppressed people of Lebanon should be convinced that the Islamic movement would soon disappoint all the diabolic dreams of the U.S. and the usurper Zionist regime, the message said.

CSO: 4600/548

SYRIA OFFERED ARMED FORCES AGAINST ISRAEL

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 7 Jun 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] TEHRAN – "We have prepared part of our infantry and armored forces to be expedited to the battle-fronts against the Zionist enemy at the first possible opportunity," President Ali Khamenei said in a message to the Syrian President, Hafez Assad concerning the Israeli attack on southern Lebanon.

In a part of his message he said that this outrageous move by Israel was undoubtedly foreboding a new plot against the existence and dignity of world Muslims. He added that it was clear that Israel was after fulfilling its plots for the occupation of southern Lebanon in order to increase the pressure on progressive Middle Eastern countries through the help of other puppets of the U.S. in the region.

"In the wake of such an attack it is necessary to find answers to two significant questions : Firstly, what factors have encouraged Israel to embark on occupation of yet another part of the Islamic land? And secondly, what should be done to counter this move?" the President asked.

Khamenei said that the orders for attacking Sidon, occupying vast regions of southern Lebanese territory, and the bombardment of the defenseless Muslim people, in addition to the bases of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) unquestionably came from the summit of the heads of states of imperialist countries being currently held in France.

The message, in another part said that the nations in the Middle East were asking why the possibilities and potentials of the Islamic world are not employed to end these tragic scenes which lead to daily massacres of the Palestinian peoples in southern Lebanon.

"Today is the day when all the manpower – military, propaganda, political and economic – of the Islamic world must be mobilized against these successive aggressions which inflict the deprived," Khamenei said.

He also declared that, though involved in an imposed war, Iran would still employ its forces to repel the attack of the regime occupying Quds on southern Lebanon.

Khamenei concluded his message by saying that as the first step in this connection Iran had prepared part of its infantry and armored forces to be expedited to the battlefronts against Israel at the first opportunity it gets.

CSO: 4600/547

OPENING OF SEMINAR ON WORLD LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Jun 82 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN, (IRNA) - A one week seminar of the representatives of World Liberation Movements was open in Tehran on June 8th, birthday of Twelfth Imam of the Household of the Prophet (SAW) Imam Mehdi (AS).

The head of the Liberation Movements Department of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi, in a press conference here announced this Sunday and said that June 8th had been declared World Oppressed Day.

The Liberation Movement Department sponsoring the seminar has invited some 350 guests from over one hundred Islamic, Asian and African countries to take part in the seminar.

Hojjatoleslam Hashemi said in the press conference that the seminar would be inaugurated by Ayatollah Meshkini, the Friday prayers leader of the Holy City of Qom in the Esteqlal Hotel.

He said that the program slated for the guests included a visit with the Leader of the Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Imam Khomeini as well as Ayatollah Montazeri in Qom.

He futher told reporters that other committed Muslims whose line of thinking was close to that of the Islamic Revolution of Iran had been invited to the seminar.

Hojjatoleslam Hashemi stressed that the Zionist regime whose etxstence was based on racism, expansionsim and opposition to revealed religion was the greatest threat to the Muslims and Islamic countries in the region.

The Zionist regime has been able to bring some of the so-called Muslim governments of the region, such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and others, under its influence. The Zionist regime in addition to being a Satanic military power, had pretensions of acting as the gendarme of the region and which acted as a center for the espionage activities of the United States Centeral Intelligence Agency he added.

Therefore the regime occupying Holy Qods was a threat to the Arab and other Muslim countries of the region he stressed.

In addition to its other missions, the Zionist regime, through its agents in Egypt, the rightists in Lebanon, Jordan, the Iraqi Baathists and with the unconditional support of the US, has in fact taken over control over many political and military current in the region.

In another part of his press conference, the Hojjatoleslam said that prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran Superpowers and the US and the Zionist regime in particular did not pay much attention to the World Liberation Movements.

However, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution the big powers have been investing a great amount to push these movements towards the East or the West in roder to take the destiny of the liberation movements into their hands in either of these blocs.

CSO: 4600/548

BAKHTIAR GROUP SAYS 'FOREIGN' INTERESTS WORK AGAINST UNITY OF EXILE GROUPS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 73, 27 May 82 p 5

[Text] The National Iranian Resistance Movement, led by Shahpour Bakhtiar, has accused "certain foreign powers" of attempts to frustrate the efforts of various opposition groups to form an efficient and strong coalition.

NEHZAT, the movement's official paper, claims in its latest issue that there are "ample signs that mischief is interfering with the work of uniting all the nationalist opposition groups." It says that unnecessary objections created by some groups on the way of unity, political flirtations, publication of divisive pamphlets and the differences on spurious issues are all signs that some people are creating obstacles against the movement for unity.

The paper argues that the West brought the Khomeyni regime to replace that of the Shah because Khomeyni could put on an anti-American mask to fool people. But, it says, the plot misfired; and Khomeyni has created a situation which could drive Iran into the arms of communism. So the Khomeyni regime is doomed to failure, NEHZAT says. Now the West is trying to make sure that Khomeyni is replaced not by a truly independent nationalist government but by yet another puppet regime.

NEHZAT recognizes three groups among the opposition who cannot, and must not, be regarded as truly nationalist. One group comprises the corrupt elements of the former regime, the second comprises rejects of the Khomeyni regime, such as Bani-Sadr, and the third group comprises those leftists whose main aim is to push a liberated Iran into the Soviet camp. It gives a convincing account of how the leftist, radical and even liberal groups in the West are helping sections of the opposition to Khomeyni who are either fully-fledged communists or are bent on replacing Khomeyni's totalitarianism with an even more radical and totalitarian regime of their own.

The paper insists that any unity based on mere opposition to Khomeyni is bound to meet with failure. It says that Khomeyni's policy when he emerged as leader in Paris was based on the single theme of "Let the Shah Go," and that after that the other matters would be sorted out. That kind of policy, NEHZAT says, no longer attracts Iranians. "The overthrow of Khomeyni and the question of an alternative government are not two separate issues but a single target," it says.

NEHZAT reiterates the movement's original stand that all the truly nationalist groups must once and for all give up the idea of bringing the extremists (whether royalist, Marxist or Islamic) into the alliance. Instead they should work out a platform to embrace all those nationalist groups who place Iran above ideological and partisan considerations. To do so, NEHZAT concludes, they must also give up the idea of gathering under the banner of this or that person or patron; rather they should create a platform.

Observers noted that for the first time the National Iranian Resistance Movement had implicated Western powers in attempts to thwart unity among Iranian opposition groups. Apart from that, the NIRM was always known to oppose inclusion of extremists in any alliance.

For their part the leftist groups have always fought with the purely nationalist groups as fiercely as they have fought with Khomeyni. Mojahedin, Fedayeen, Paykar and Maoists, acting under a unified command, do their best to break up rallies organised by the NIRM, the National Front, the Royalists or followers of Admiral Madani.

The leftists also make no promises to share their resources with other anti-Khomeyni groups. "They only want to attract publicity for themselves, trying to make it look as if they are the only viable opposition to the mullahs--a point which nationalists and royalists strongly dispute," an Iranian observer told IPS.

CSO: 4600/534

KEEP OUT OF POLITICS, CHILDREN ARE ADVISED BY TEACHER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 73, 27 May 82 p 4

[Text] Open letters, distributed furtively, are part and parcel of life in Iran, where all the media is state-owned. IPS has published a number of those which have found their way to Europe, among them a couple from a former teacher who has developed a forceful style in denouncing the regime. This is the latest of his letters to reach us.

My dear children,

This letter comes to you from a former teacher. I am addressing two groups of pupils in particular. One group are those of the dear pupils who regard their primary task as political work rather than learning and who follow such organisations as the Fedayeen, Mojahedin and others. And there are those who regard the greatest imposter of our age, the most bloodthirsty creature history has ever known, as the Imam of the Ummat and the deputy of God on earth. This letter from an old teacher is an attempt to open your eyes. Please do not throw it away without reading it. I know that you are told by your teachers and your "Imam" not to read anything which is not authorised. I know this, but I ask you to please read this.

Let me begin my letter by returning to the eve of the so-called revolution. Before then politics, especially political work against the regime of the Shah, was the domain of the youth, or to be more precise, students of the university. They were brave enough, inexperienced enough and also idealistic enough to take risks and engage in antigovernment political activity at the risk of being arrested and so forth. But they would gradually grow up, find jobs, marry and take their lives more seriously. What happened in the autumn of 1357 (1978), when secondary and primary school-children were dragged into politics, was the greatest treason to the Iranian nation. God may never forgive Khomeyni and his one-time ally Rajavi who soiled our schools and school-children with their own dirty politics. Iran has paid a heavy price for this. Since then the sacred domain of schools has been spoiled by politics. This still goes on. One group of school-children is tricked into believing that Brother Massoud is the saviour of mankind, while another group is tricked into believing that Imam Khomeyni is God on earth. Then these two groups start fighting among themselves and some of them might be killed in the process. Khomeyni tells these children to spy on their classmates and their parents. Brother Rajavi, too, gives the same order to them. Both of them are from the same fibre (they are birds of the same feather). They both want to spill your blood,

to trade in your blood. Khomeyni and Rajavi are your enemies. They simply make use of your simplicity and lack of experience to achieve their dirty ends.

Rajavi is sitting in his safe house in Paris and tells you to go to the streets to shout against Khomeyni. He knows too well that in so doing you may be killed. But he does not care for your lives; his only goal is to achieve political leadership at any cost. If he really was your friend he would tell you to study well, to broaden your minds and gain experience and knowledge to be good citizens of your country. In no other society do political leaders so willingly sacrifice lives of school-children in their own dirty political games.

Khomeyni is even worse than Rajavi. He sends his snakes, who look like mullahs, to schools to recruit you for the war. Khomeyni is an ignorant man (Jahel) but he is no fool. He knows you are not fit for fighting but he likes to kill you in this way because, like Zahak, he loves to kill and let others kill for him. He is happy when he receives reports that 5,000 boys were killed by the Iraqis; otherwise why does he send you to war? One must really be a beast to send you innocent ones to death. Both Rajavi and Khomeyni are devilish. Have you heard of any mullah or his son being killed on the battlefield? No, they want to kill you.

My children, your only duty in life is to grow up healthy and educated, to respect your parents and keep your minds open to accept new ideas. Life is an ever-changing process. You will have time to indulge in politics but now you must devote your time to learning. And you must play and enjoy life. Do not allow these gravediggers who have become rulers of Iran to kill the desire in your minds to enjoy life. Your ideological teachers will tell you that I am a corrupt person. Do not listen to them because what I tell you is to be natural; what your bloodsucking teachers tell you is to prepare yourselves for death before having tasted life. These mullahs have been our real enemies. They are dirty worms. Do not listen to them. You have a right to enjoy life.

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IRANIANS IN DIASPORA

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 73, 27 May 82 pp 6-10

[Article by Teezbin]

[Text] The young Shah Reza has established his credibility in interviews in recent weeks as a young man of liberal and realistic ideas--and one who understands that the only contribution he can make to the future of Iran is as a constitutional symbol of a nation with a long history of monarchy.

His statements in interviews have pleased most people who want to see a return to sensible constitutional and secular rule in Iran. They feel opponents of the monarchy cannot accuse him or those supporting him of wanting to bring back the kind of authoritarian regime which was removed by the uprising and which was, tragically, replaced by one much less human and even more authoritarian.

Some of the more enthusiastic supporters of the monarchy were disappointed to hear him say he would accept a republic if the Iranian people opted for one. They feel that the ordinary man in Iran is not concerned about political systems of ideologies but simply about a system of authority which he can respect and which is familiar to him. A republican system is alien to his nature, they say, and one of the main reasons he accepts Khomeyni's domination is that in his eyes Khomeyni has merely taken the place of the Shah, having the added authority that Islam, in the ordinary Iranian's eyes, also supplies.

But the young Shah has accepted the view of his advisers that he must show he understands that absolute monarchy is dead and done with and that any insistence by him on a monarchical system only proves that he is not democratic, not prepared to honour the people's choice.

So far so good. But there are two points in his remarks as reported in the press which could cause some concern among those who might support him. One is the tendency to decry those who have until now been his most fervent supporters, with the inevitable implication that because their views on the monarchy are less moderate than his he will cut himself off from them. This suggests some political naivete on the part of his advisers, for it is difficult to imagine any mature politician, no matter how liberal, openly rejecting his most devoted supporters simply because they were more catholic than the Pope, so to speak.

What the young Shah must do in this respect is to set up a secretariat which can advise and guide these more fanatically monarchist groups onto the kind of course he is himself adopting. Certainly he should not show any disapproval of them or condemn them for loyalty to his father or family or himself. For these fervent monarchists are the minority who were not disloyal to his father when the crunch came and to reject them would be poor reward for that loyalty.

It would also be suicidal as far as his own cause is concerned. If the young Shah gets down to a detailed study of the factors which helped cause the fall of his father's regime he will find that one of them was the resentment caused among middle and lower echelon officials by the large-scale campaign to attract back to Iran former opponents of the regime. On their return many of these people were given the better jobs and salaries. This hurt countless loyal, hardworking officials who felt they had been discriminated against.

This should remind the young Shah that he has taken on a very great responsibility in offering himself as a symbol of unity for the opposition to Khomeyni. He has already administered a big shock to many of his supporters because of the reports of his remarks on the subject of the more fervent monarchist groups. This was a minor, but significant political blunder which he cannot afford.

He must remember that it is part of a democratic political or public figure's duty not to offend those whose views he may not fully share, especially when they are his own loyal supporters and when they had no direct intimation of his particular stand before. Since he left London after making his remarks those who were taken aback by his stance have not received the explanations they so clearly seek and which would act as the palliative to their hurt feelings.

These people, the young king should appreciate, are not the corrupt or the selfish millionaires who are blamed by ordinary Iranians for helping bring his father's regime into an unjustified disrepute, and who actually care little for the Pahlavis or their country. They are ordinary Iranians whose anger over their own fate and that of their country has led them to demonstrate their respect and support for the late Shah and to his son.

Which brings us to the second point which Reza Shah must, in our view and that of many others, face up to. That is the impression given in the press during and after his stay in London that he refuses to defend his father, but will let history make the decision on his father's true role.

Does he think history is going to learn something that is not recorded for the world today? How will history find out the truth about the Iran of his father's days if someone doesn't tell them about it? And if he refuses to defend his father now will not the world think there is nothing to defend?

The new Shah must realise he is a Pahlavi and that his claim to the throne of Iran must rest on the Pahlavis having some credibility, as capable or well meaning, patriotic holders of the monarchy and the trust of the people of Iran.

It is true, as Shahpour Bakhtiar and all the other opposition leaders keep saying, that there were a lot of abuses of rights in the pre-Khomeyni Iran and it is little defence of that to say conditions are a hundred times worse now.

But it is also true to say there were many benefits as a result of the Pahlavi reign, as Shahpour Bakhtiar and the rest to their eternal discredit--beneficiaries of them as they all were--never mention. Reza Shah, the present Shah's grandfather, really did come to power in a country that was as wretched and backward as any with a proud history could imagine. The constitutional movement of the early 1900's had failed to achieve its aims, Iran was both powerless and living without hope. Reza Shah halted that slide and set Iran onto the road that by the 1970's had made the possibility of economic and social justice in Iran an achievable dream for the first time for centuries.

Had Reza Shah or his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, listened to the advice and the pleas of the majority of privileged Iranians, which includes the majority of the educated class until the 1970's, they would not have forced through the development plans that have enabled Iran to reach a point when they could not only survive but win a war against Iraq. They would have kept the country a nation of share croppers, of farmers and cottagers using centuries old methods. The educational institutions would have remained archaic preserves of old-fashioned academics, old-fashioned banking and purchasing methods would have kept consumption down and expectations and hope would have remained equally limited. And the industrialised countries could have benefited from the oil wealth without any of it being dissipated in albeit often grandiose but essential projects designed to offer Iranians incentive and the means to drag themselves out of the slough of despair and degeneracy in which they were firmly embedded until the 1950's.

The benefits to Iran of the Pahlavi regime are incalculable and only a craven society like that which the sudden wealth in Iran produced would fail to see that. And this is something that the young Shah must not only make clear to the world with the means that he possesses; it should also make him wary about some of the advice he receives from his compatriots. The lesson of recent events is there for him and anyone else to see--politically Iranians are incapable of pragmatic thought other than the ability to see where force can triumph over any other means of persuasion.

He must note the lesson that not a single opposition group until the arrival of Mojahedin leaders in Europe was able to develop a meaningful political organisation or have any effect on Western public opinion. And the achievement of the Mojahedin, let's face it, is the result of their willingness to accept the advice of Western leftist groups and to follow that advice and the example the Westerners have given them. In fact, the Mojahedin were given and took much of the same kind of advice when the uprising in Iran got under way and that was again a key reason as to why they were effective. They also learned the lesson from the terrorist and Marxist groups that you must wipe out your opponents the minute the occasion arises--and that's what the Mojahedin did in their early days of power-sharing with the mullahs in Iran.

In the light of this the new Shah must learn the lessons of history, and there is plenty of the recent kind to help him. It is interesting that most of the favourable publicity he received during and following his visit to London, which he himself insisted on making against some shortsighted advice, was the result of a private meeting with British press people that was arranged by a British well-wisher. Had he not had that contact there is every reason to

believe he may not have received a single mention outside the Persian language exile press. As a result of that meeting the foreign press is unlikely ever again to try to dismiss him as merely a mindless pretender or a playboy, which they often did before.

Putting his father's reign under the microscope may have the same effect as the press having met him and realised that he is a rational, well-meaning human being who has a commitment to try to help his country and his compatriots if he can. There may be some things, like the activities of Savak, which any Iranian may feel ashamed of. But let's have them revealed, let the world know the extent or the limitation of the shameful things, and let the responsibility be taken and shared out among those who were responsible. And let's see the real facts so that the rumour and the lies can be expurgated and some comparisons made with similar activities in many other countries which have not such a bad name as Iran used to have.

Let's have the corruption spelt out--one fears that if a really rigid yardstick is applied, not a single Iranian will come out white--and expose those who were the real culprits, be they members of the Pahlavi family, the merchants or the National Front. Let's get the corruption in perspective, see where it was unique and where it was no different from anywhere else in the better-off sections of the Third World.

In this respect the young Shah should bear one thing in mind. Iran was one of the most backward countries between Europe and Japan when Reza Shah took over and it is only 30 years or so since it even achieved a level of security that is commonplace in much of the rest of the world. Its people still retained a naivete of thought and an unworldliness that a few years in Western educational institutions could not alleviate. Their behaviour during the uprising and since has been the personification of unworldliness.

They continued to hope and dream in 1978 as the flames began to eat them up--the Great Fire Extinguisher must be at hand. Experienced old hands in the Iranian game went to the slaughter like lambs; everybody believed that when the Americans and British, their longtime friends, realised their error they would put things right again. After spending years slandering the Shah and everybody who took themselves seriously enough to want to try to do something for the country, they wondered why the world didn't respect them as Iranians. Just as the opposition groups today, by constantly denigrating the past as well as the present regime in Iran in the hope that they will look more beautiful, continue to do Khomeyni's work for him by destroying their own credibility--for they are identified with the past not the future--so Iranians in the old days gave themselves a bad name.

And when we detail the bad things let's also start toting up the good that has resulted from the Pahlavis. It's an interesting phenomenon today that the regime in Iran is not only copying the general pattern of the Shah's social development--if you take away the inequalities they want to institutionalise against women and the anachronistic laws they want to apply to restrict the kind of civil rights seen as not-negotiable in the West--but also all those big industrial projects it claimed were dissipating Iran's resources before. And the Western capitalists who abandoned the Shah in such cavalier fashion are having no qualms about trying to resume their "exploitation" of Iran on the most advantageous terms they can find.

The Shah must see that the prime reason that the exile groups, other than the Mojahedin and the National Council of Resistance, enjoy no Western support is that they have failed to establish their case, even to an elementary degree. They have failed to get down to the job of charting their programmes and developing their support, either through inability or a cynical desire to avoid uncharted waters so they can continue enjoying the financial benefits of working for a group. They have fobbed off all the younger and more enthusiastic patriots who want to work for the cause and surrounded themselves with jaded old figures in most cases. Or they have remained small, individual splinter groups enjoying themselves by shooting off their mouths.

It certainly must have been moving for the young Shah to see 300 officers weeping before him when he visited London. But why were they snivelling in Claridges and not fighting or at least organising themselves to fight in Iran? Retired British officers who can barely afford a bottle of whisky a month are ready to leave today for the Falkland Islands. Isn't there something significant in the fact that Iranian officers who can afford swish homes and as many bottles of drink a day they need are crying in their cups in London and don't go nearer to Iran than Nice?

The Mojahedin and the young Iranians who belong to these and other allied groups abjure the sentiment and forget about publicising their cause. They are building up animosity to Khomeyni by any means they can. Their propaganda is getting on the air waves because they thrust it down the throats of the foreigners and make sure they can't miss it. They devote their time and effort to their cause.

The Savak in Iran was, in its own way, trying to protect the public from terrorism and the violence that the mullahs and their friends were later to launch upon them. The Mojahedin and their friends were killing policemen and others who got in their way before 1978 and after the collapse of the army they organised much of the slaughter of the innocents as well as those they could have regarded as their enemies. Yet it is Savak which still gets the bad press for its excesses; the Mojahedin, with the help of its Western friends, still gets little but praise.

It is possible, once the present stage of war and anarchy in Iran seems over, that somebody in Iran will mobilise more moderate opinion to work some kind of a coup against the extremists who are in control in Tehran today. There may just be a role for a symbol of the monarchy to play in uniting the country at that time. But how long will that symbol survive if he is seen as a symbol of a corrupt and wicked past by so many people? It is this that the new Shah must think about and consider dealing with during his cogitations on how he can best play his role when the time comes.

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REPARATIONS MAY PERSUADE TEHRAN TO MODERATE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 74, 3 Jun 82 pp 1-2

[Text] The Gulf Cooperation Council states' reported offer of $25 billion as reparations to Iran for damage caused by the Iraqi invasion seemed by midweek to have put the peace negotiations to end the war into better perspective.

With Saudi Arabia reported virtually reconciled to the idea that Iraqi president Saddam Hussain was expendable most observers who have been charting the Tehran mullahs' course closely were convinced they would find the Arabs' cash offer irresistible.

They pointed out that the graft and corruption in Iran today, though not on such a grand scale as in the late Shah's time, is more widespread among the mullahs and officials than it ever was before, and there was no sign that money has lost the overriding significance it has always had to Iranians in particular and Muslims in general.

"It was resentment over who pocketed the money that made the uprising so effective in 1978 and the fact that the Council of Guardians in Tehran this week were prepared to stand firm against the foreign trade nationalisation bill shows just how strong financial and commercial interests still are in Iran," one analyst told IPS. "The prospect of getting trade going again, with all the vast foreign interests dying to get into an Iran with its pride restored and some grandiose spending ideas back again, suggests this will do the trick."

Other political observers saw Syria's warning that it could not go along with any Iranian trespassing on Arab soil as a sign that Tehran would have to think many times before giving in to extremist calls to invade Iraq.

"There seems no doubt that if the Saudis use their influence to replace Saddam with someone more acceptable to Damascus then the Syrians will throw all their weight into persuading Tehran to agree to a ceasefire at the very least," one Paris watcher contended. "With everyone passing all the opporbrium onto Saddam, the way would be open for better relations between Tehran and Baghdad and negotiation of outstanding problems could begin."

In addition, this Iran-watcher pointed out, the Iranian regime would be able to cash in on the euphoria which a settlement making Iran such complete victors must create at home. The grovelling of the Arabs in the face of real or imagined Iranian power is a considerable salve to a people who have deepdown

resentment of Arab attitudes, and actions towards Iran in the past. This would tend to bring a majority of the people behind the mullahs' regime if it can find a way of controlling its extremists and restoring some semblance of prosperity and commercial activity once more.

"The significance of the conservative mullahs' stand against putting all foreign trade into the hands of the government is that their decision has come when the green light may soon come for getting commerce going again," an Iranian businessman who has been trading with his home country until recently said. "The appointment of Behzad Nabavi as minister of heavy industry may be either a reflection of the determination of the leftist-radical group to try to keep this area in state control or it could signal some acceptance of the fact that if industry is to get going again there needs to be some central organisation of a freer economy. All of this anyway points to the fact that there is an awareness in Tehran that something has to be done about industry and the economy soon--and an end to the war seems an essential requirement before that can happen." And, after all, it was pointed out, the reparations only require an end to armed hostilities and not to the psychological war, which the mullahs are confident they can win.

The Islamic Conference Organisation and a special representative of the Algerian president were reported in the past few days to be planning to start new mediation efforts between Iran and Iraq. French foreign minister Cheysson also hinted that France, on behalf of other European states, might also be considering some initiative when he spoke to reporters during a Mideast tour.

Friends and foes alike screamed their rage over remarks by American secretary of state Alexander Haig that now was the time for the United States to enter the arena again. They either felt Washington should have used its influence effectively before or that it has no right to interest itself in the region anyway.

Tehran has demonstrated once again that it knows how to conduct the psychological warfare that brought about the downfall of the Shah. Besides setting Arab hearts beating at a fast rate it has also seized on the victory mood to turn once again on domestic opponents. Attacks were made this week on suspected Mojahedin headquarters and a number of people died in clashes. And officials scoffed at the regime's opponents like Bani-Sadr, whom Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani described as "a dead man." He said confidently that the French would later on hand him over in return for a few lucrative contracts in Iran.

The radio and media began quickly to concentrate on the question of reconstruction, which would have the effect of turning the public's minds away from other worries as well as condition them for acceptance of any Arab "ransom" money to bring about the end of the war. The government has had to explain, however, that emergency measures to control short food and other supplies must stay for some time even if the war does end.

There were a few wry comments on the fact that the newly recommended minister for heavy industry Behzad Nabavi was to be replaced as minister for executive affairs by Gholan Reza Aghazadeh, who is reported to be the son of Khomeyni's longtime treasurer and private financial organiser. "With all that money

coming in, it is best to have its destination looked after in advance," was one quip commonly heard in Tehran.

A hint of strain between the professional armed forces and the revolutionary militias was contained in remarks made by Khomeyni's loyal army commander Sayad Shirazi when he spoke at Friday prayers in Tehran. He praised the key role of the professional forces in winning the war and said they were as committed to the Imam and the velayat-e-faghih as everyone else. He took pains to emphasise the important role of the full-time fighting men.

Khomeyni showed all his old cunning when he received representatives of the Majlis this week following the Council of Guardians' rejection of their foreign trade nationalisation bill. He was at pains not to take sides again, stressing only that the Majlis must pass bills quickly but they must be 100 per cent Islamic in character. He did not take the side of the Guardians in declaring that that particular bill was Islamic, as the Guardians refuted, but he also did not condemn it either.

But where external affairs were concerned Khomeyni was in full cry after his opponents. He contended in no uncertain manner that not only had the Islamic Republic won its war but that it was a torrent sweeping through the whole region that could not be stopped. His Arab neighbours seemed to be carried away by this idea themselves.

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WHY MULLAHS' THINKING IS STILL CONFUSED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 74, 3 Jun 82 pp 3-5

[Text] Informed observers inside Iran report that the theocratic leadership is divided on what course of action to adopt once the war with Iraq is no longer a top priority.

President Saddam Hussain of Iraq launched his massive attack on Iran in the last days of September 1980, at a time when the Khomeyni regime was trying to consolidate its hold on the reins of power. At that time the Islamic Republican Party was rapidly extending its tentacles, exterminating the remainder of the nationalist and royalist sympathisers from the civil service and the army and, finally, neutralising the more liberal elements within the revolutionary administration, such as the followers of former premier Bazargan and president Bani-Sadr.

The advent of war was a welcome development both to the fundamentalists and the so-called moderates. Bani-Sadr, who was then appointed by Khomeyni as the commander-in-chief of the army, remarked at the time that the attack was the best thing which could happen to the revolution.

Since then, Bani-Sadr, as the representative of the non-clerical faction of Iran's rulers, has been eliminated from the scene, Bazargan as the liberal element has been silenced, the top brass of the IRP have been removed through assassination, the non-conformist or deviationist elements such as Mojahedin-e-Khalq have been rejected and the apparatus of repression strengthened. The regime has also effectively brought under its control all the available instruments of political, economic and social power.

On the other hand, the regime has dangerously narrowed its support base, alienated many of its original supporters, helped stiffen popular opposition and spread even more apathy, and has failed to eradicate the potential counter-revolutionary forces who are now lying low, waiting to surface once there is a viable and credible leadership to call on them.

According to informed observers in Iran, it is this counter-revolutionary potential which is still a source of anxiety to the theocratic leaders. As long as the war with Iraq goes on, it remains dormant; but once the war is over they fear some action.

One group of mullahs believes that the best way to deal with these anti-regime elements is to turn them into a powerless silent majority; and to do this it is necessary to create one crisis after another so that they will not find time to settle down and reactivate their opposition into more practical activity. For this group, the best thing now is to continue the war with Iraq even though it may simply mean an uneasy ceasefire broken occasionally by a burst of gunfire to make headlines. This group, who take their cue from the ideas of Beheshti, the assassinated ayatollah, thrive on tension and turmoil. Oil minister Mohammad Gharazi, leader of the IRP storm troopers Hadi Ghaffari, and the commander of the Revolutionary Guards Mohsen Rezai, are in this group. They have been trying hard to get Khomeyni's son Ahmad on their side.

Another group believes that the time is ripe for allowing the tensions to subside and life to return to normal. They argue that with a little effort it will be possible to revive the economy, not to the hectic pace of the Shah's time, but to a degree of the old style subsistence level. Thus the hard-pressed population, who by now have given up any hope of returning to the prosperity of the Shah's day, will in any case be grateful for having a little more to eat and a little security, and therefore will accept the suzerainty of the theocracy and not be a potential threat. Foreign Minister Velayati, Labour Minister Tavakoli and Central Bank Governor Noorbakhsh are among this group.

Yet a third group believes that the victorious revolutionaries are far from having established a fully doctrinaire society. They contend that the revolution must not be allowed to stagnate, and that sooner rather than later it should expand abroad. This group includes such extremists as Mussavi-Khoyinia, who is deputy speaker of the Majlis and close to Ahmad Khomeini.

There are other smaller groups such as the remnants of the Fedayeen-e-Eslam, who are often in league with the Hojjatiyoun who make up the most reactionary group among the fundamentalists. What is important to realise, according to Tehran sources, is that there are no clearly-drawn lines of loyalty and conviction among the grassroots supporters of the regime. Noorbakhsh, who, as Central Bank Governor is, technically speaking a second level functionary, like Tavakoli, often wavers from one position to another. Even Premier Mussavi often changes sides, though he is known to be loyal to Khomeyni.

All this explains the confused state of mind which one often sees reflected among the regime's top functionaries, such as the Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafshanjani, President Khamene'i and former Premier Mahdavi-Kani. It is now obvious that all these so-called leading figures often find it difficult to plan ahead or make a major policy decision other than those very obvious ones already clarified by Khomeyni. They have found that the best policy is to repeat anti-American slogans and do nothing.

To a great extent it must be realised that the leaders are often half-educated, inexperienced mullahs who are being helped either by the rejects of the former regime or professional students of the 1970's who have a record of opposing the Shah. Because of their clannish nature the mullahs of the Khomeyni camp, mostly of peasant origins, have purged all the capable and expert cadres. So they also lack the expertise and administrative ability to make decisions and implement them.

Thus a combination of internal rivalry, limited capability, inherent indecision and overall insecurity account for the present situation in which taking of hard decisions, such as whether to continue the war or get the economy going, is impossible. And this situation helps those elements who are adventurous, like Mussavi-Khoyinia, of U.S. hostage fame, and the killer judges of the courts. They go about their jobs and will only listen to Khomeyni.

Indeed, Khomeyni is the sole arbiter and decision-maker but he is negative, often seemingly thirsty for blood and opposed to all manner of constructive work. And he is also prone to influence by his son and two or three close aides including Mussavi-Ardabili.

So it will be Khomeyni who must ultimately decide whether to keep the kettle of revolutionary euphoria boiling or let normal conditions return. The chances are that he will not decide. And while this indecision and Byzantine infighting goes on several power groups like the ones referred to above, plus the powerful Qom theological teachers, the revolutionary guards and the Tudeh Party, will consolidate their respective bases, waiting to steal the show from their rivals when the opportune time comes.

Khomeyni knows that the opportune time will be when he dies. He is anxious to have Ayatollah Montazeri installed as his successor and the future of his son made secure before he dies. His main worry is desecration of his name and grave after his death. He is known to have remarked on how Stalin and Mao were disgraced after their deaths, not by the counter-revolutionaries but by their own disciples. So his overriding concern is to make his mark so strong that after he has gone nobody will dare to disgrace him or his family.

This obsession is said to have been responsible for Khomeyni's wavering attitude to the question of his succession. He has ordered that Montazeri be groomed for the task but somehow does not do much to help him publicly.

One explanation is that he dislikes the possibility of endorsing somebo y in public only to see him disgraced by other mullahs later. Similarly he hates to make a public decision which he may have to change later. A final accommodation with Iraq falls into this category. He was at one stage forced to make the war a personal battle with President Hussain. Now because his own person is involved he cannot publicly make peace, even on Iran's terms, unless Saddam Hussain is personally out. Consequently, what sort of political capital the mullahs make now that they have made military gains depends on how they wish to shape up their domestic policies.

Meanwhile, they will have to consider what they are going to do with the army next. After three years in power and repeated purges the army must now have been fully subverted by the mullahs. But it is basically an outcast. The favoured body is the revolutionary guards. In due time both forces will become power bases for their ambitious commanders.

But first and foremost the mullahs must deal with the mass of the cynical, apathetic and suppressed population which feels cheated by Khomeyni's revolution and robbed of what now seems a much more satisfactory life it once enjoyed. This mass was called the silent majority during the Shah's time.

Today the mullahs fear it will provide the potential for a mass revolt once again, especially when the war no longer provides an easy excuse to suppress it.

And until Khomeyni decides to throw his weight behind one of the several contending groups, his administration will obviously continue to try feeding the mass with doctrinaire revolutionary rhetoric and easing the levers of repression a little, only to tighten the screws later.

CSO: 4600/535

REGIME'S CLAIM TO 'ECONOMIC SELF-RELIANCE' REJECTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 74, 3 Jun 82 pp 6-7

[Text] In an open letter to Labour Minister Ahmad Tavakoli a group of former plan organisation officials have rejected government claims that the country has achieved near self-reliance in the economy.

"As official spokesman for this outlaw regime you have claimed that Iran is on the verge of economic self-reliance," the letter said. "We know you are telling lies, and know that you, too, do not believe your own lies. In fact, telling lies is the only thing your regime does besides murdering and plundering the people.

"But let us remind you that lowering people's standard of living to the level of 14 centuries ago, while auctioning off our national wealth at cut prices, cannot be called economic self-reliance.

"Your murderous Imam inherited an expanding economy with high employment, 15 billion dollars in cash reserves and six billion dollars in gold and other foreign assets at 1979 value. Since then the price of our oil has risen threefold and yet half of the working population is out of jobs, consumption of all essential goods has been cut by one third, three million Iranians have been made destitute, one million Iranians have been forced to seek refuge abroad and 100,000 Iranians have perished in your jails or on battlefields.

"During this period the cost of living has tripled, black marketeers are sucking people's blood and essential goods are scarce. So you claim self-reliance at the expense of condemning the people to extreme poverty. Any fool can lock himself up in a cave and live like a caveman to claim that he is self-sufficient. But life is not self-sufficiency. Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States are the strongest nations, yet they are not self-sufficient.

"But you are a liar. Your regime has not achieved even the kind of self-sufficiency which you claim although it has brought poverty and misery to us. You are selling oil at very low prices while the Shah used to sell at the best available price. You export less oil than we did under the Shah. But the damage done to our oilfields more than compensates for any future benefit of lower production.

"Meanwhile, you import everything from wheat to the simplest manufactured goods. Under the Shah we used to import high technology. You import finished goods. There lies the difference between your system and ours.

"Worse, you have made thousands of educated and capable Iranians unemployed and given their jobs to less qualified Indians, Pakistanis and other carpet-baggers. We former officials have been forced out of our jobs and our rightful salaries cut while less qualified foreigners who are obedient to you get salaries which belong to us. Shame on you.

"Your idea of self-reliance is in fact isolation. Your regime can survive only by isolating Iran from the rest of the world. Your claim to self-reliance is a lie."

The former Plan Organisation officials, who have not identified themselves by name in the open letter for obvious reasons, belong to the Iran Civil Servants Association, which claims wide support among the Iranian officials, whether purged, retired or serving. It says its main task is to provide civilian support to any military or other action by centrist groups aimed at the overthrow of the Khomeyni regime.

CSO: 4600/535

CLANDESTINE GROUP APPEALS TO FAMILIES OF WAR-DEAD

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 74, 3 Jun 82 p 7

[Text] A group calling itself Irandin has called on the members of the families of the war dead to take Khomeyni to task for having sent their sons, brothers, or fathers to death so indiscriminately.

In a pamphlet distributed in Tehran the group has said: "We will not let Khomeyni capitalise on the blood of our brothers, fathers and husbands. We will not let this bloodsucking old dog build his imaginary empire on the blood of our dearest ones. We will take this criminal to task. He will tell us why he sent children to explode mines, why he so treacherously destroyed Iran's mighty army to leave the country defenceless and then send so many people to serve as cannon fodder; and why he encouraged Saddam to attack Iran after he had mutilated the army."

The group said the mullahs must not be allowed to take the credit for sacrifices which the Iranian people made to save their motherland. It said Khomeyni must not spill Iranian blood to bolster the killer regimes of Hafez Assad in Syria and Qadhdhafi in Libya, or to engage in inter-Arab politics.

"Iranians have no mandate to liberate Palestine," it said. "We also have no desire to be crusaders in an Islamic war because as Shias most of us Iranians are not even accepted by the bulk of the Muslims. We are Iranians first and foremost and our primary task is to build up our country from the ruins of an Islamic theocracy."

Informed sources said the new group must comprise factions of the Pan-Iranists who have defected from Daryoush Forouhar's party as well as elements of the royalists. The style of Persian used in the pamphlet resembles that of a famous Iranian thinker, Ahmad Kasravi, who founded the Pakdinan Society in the 1940's. He was virulently anti-Shia and an advocate of basic reforms in Islam. He was murdered by gunmen of the Fedayeen-e-Eslam in 1946. At that time Khomeyni was a small time preacher sympathising with the Fedayeen-e-Eslam.

CSO: 4600/535

AMINI SAYS COOPERATION WITH LEFT 'OUT OF QUESTION'

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 74, 3 Jun 82 pp 7-8

[Text] Elder statesman Ali Amini has announced that so far more than 40 political groups and "hundreds" of independent political figures have joined his National Salvation Front, an organisation which he set up at his Paris base to coordinate opposition activity.

However, in a communique released in Paris last week, Amini said that so far none of the "dependent or independent leftist elements or republicans" has joined the National Salvation Front. He stressed that cooperation in any form between the front and such elements has proved to be out of the question, anyway.

"I know well that even if I wished to cooperate with the leftist and republican groups, they would not welcome this because I belong to a certain section of society," he said. "If I have repeatedly said that at present the question is Iran's salvation and not a particular form of government, I did not intend to remain indifferent to the survival of the monarchy and implementation of the constitution.

"Since I believe monarchy has a popular base in Iran with deep roots among our people, I recently went to Rabat, in fulfillment of the wish of dear compatriots, to submit a full report on the considerable achievements of the National Salvation Front to Reza Pahlavi," he said.

Dr Amini's declaration seems to be an attempt to dispel anxieties of some people as to his faith in monarchy. Amini has thus stressed that, while he advocates unity among all opposition groups and his belief that opposition to Khomeyni should not be the domain of any one group, on a purely pragmatic basis the National Salvation Front cannot provide a forum for leftists and republicans.

CSO: 4600/535

BANI-SADR STILL BELIEVES IRANIAN PEOPLE WANT HIM BACK

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 74, 3 Jun 82 pp 8-9

[Text] In separate interviews in the London-based monthly magazine MIDDLE EAST this week Khomeyni's heir-apparent Ayatollah Montazeri and former president Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr disagreed over the support Bani-Sadr enjoyed among the Iranian people.

Bani-Sadr says that in retrospect he feels he was mistaken in not making a confrontation with Khomeyi over the ayatollah's violation of the principle of free elections. "Unfortunately it was absolutely taboo...All my advisers, everyone around me said we must avoid confrontation," he told the magazine. "They thought it was too soon." But now, he felt, he had enough support at that time to have stood against Khomeyni.

"Recently one of Khomeyni's ministers visited me and he said that if Khomeyni no longer existed it would cost the regime a million dead to prevent Bani-Sadr from returning to power. The people used to be totally behind Khomeyni; today he represents only a minority, and remains in power through terror," he told MIDDLE EAST. The regime only survived by giving priority to violence, and to a state of permanent crisis, he added. "To allow any power to be given to rational management would spell the end for the mullahs. If they allow experts in, they're finished."

He explained what had happened when Rajai was prime minister. "We asked why Bani-Sadr was not being allowed to carry through his economic programmes and the answer was: 'Because he is not faithful to the policies of the Imam. The Imam has said that the people must learn to suffer. But Bani-Sadr has been running around everywhere in the world buying supplies. And by doing this he has prevented the people from feeling despair."

Asked about relations between the Tudeh Party and Khomeyni, Bani-Sadr explained, "The Tudeh Party members are extremely active; they are engaged mainly in espionage and the secret police, but also in publicity work and in foreign trade. One estimate is that up to 30 per cent of the higher bureaucracy is made up of Tudeh members." But the religious leaders were not worried about the growing power of Communists because "the Tudeh Party is totally discredited in the eyes of the population," MIDDLE EAST quoted him as saying.

In general Bani-Sadr was optimistic. "We believe that if we succeed in removing Khomeyni, then within six months we can establish a democracy. It will not be easy; we know that. There are the Americans to worry about, and the war with Iraq, and the economic crisis. We will have to unite the opposition and mobilise the population, and this will be very difficult. But I am preparing for my return to Iran."

Montazeri dismissed Bani-Sadr's claims without compunction during an interview with the magazine's Nasira Sharma. "Bani-Sadr was sadly mistaken in thinking that he had the support of the masses," Montazeri said. "The votes for his presidency were solely due to the Imam. Believe me, he never had any public support. The masses never loved him."

Montazeri, whom the magazine described as "one of the most respected religious figures in Iran," was willing to answer any questions, the magazine reported, but his "secretary" frequently intervened and finally cut short the interview. Part of the text is as follows:

Q: As future Imam of Iran, your views are important. How do you feel about the present situation in Iran, with the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) facing internal conflict?

Montazeri: It's not appropriate at this moment to call me Imam. According to our constitution and Shia conventions, a panel of the learned and wise will nominate the Imam.

Its modus operandi is referred to in the theory of Islam, but there is no fixed procedure. As to the second part of your question, I am not aware of such differences. I am convinced that such a situation does not exist inside the IRP. But I am not a member. I understand that there is no rift in the IRP, although some members have withdrawn. The question of a conflict and division is not important for the IRP, but it is significant for relations between the IRP and other political groups. The Hojatieh is a splinter group, a party consisting of numerous aggressive members. Tell me where such a situation is not found?

Q. Why are there differences with other parties and groups?

In the beginning, the IRP gave complete independence to everybody, irrespective of ideology of political affiliation. All parties functioned in total freedom, but they misused it. They collected a lot of arms and ammunition. Mojahedin (e-Khalq), Fedayeen guerrillas and Tudeh members stored unlimited arms and imposed martial law and does not bestow freedom on any group or party. But in Iran the reverse happened, perhaps because of the government's incapability and the lack of time at its disposal.

Other political groups took advantage of the situation and generated a lot of hatred among the youth, provoking them to revolt against the IRP. It was done primarily to acquire power. While in prison I met Musa Khiabani and Massoud Rajavi and we talked for about two hours. It was several days before we were released. It was our first meeting and they hammered consistently on one point. They said Imam Khomeyni sitting in Paris was eager to bring revolution

to Iran, but who would d power afterwards? I told them I was sure that the Imam had thought about the question of power. But both were very keen to impress on me that power should be given to them, and asked me to convey this to Paris. Fedayeen, Mojahedin, Paykaris were all set against the IRP and found a following in those young men who are emotionally set to sacrifice for the nation. They started ideological classes, seminars and discussions in the universities and usurped power by hoarding arms and ammunition with the aim of controlling government.

Q. Many people who support your revolution are critical of the recent murders and killings. They do not understand the logic of the Islamic principle according to which a 12-year-old girl can be executed.

How could one rationalise or legalise the nefarious activities of these youths who come like a swarm to blow up important personalities, burn public property and kill the Pasdars (Revolutionary Guards)? Islamic authorities say that if a Muslim is killed by an enemy who is Kafar (non-Muslim) then it is legal and desirable to butcher the whole troop. My son Muhammad Montazeri was a revolutionary who had suffered much in prison, but he was killed, sitting in the IRP office along with 73 other persons. Tell me what we should do with such criminals? It's all lies and propaganda by the opposition. Tell me when we have killed a 12-year-old girl? The Shah killed about 4,000 Maiden e-Jale as well as committing numerous daily murders. But in the past three years, including the execution of Savak members, Mojahedin and other such people, the total number has not reached 4,000.

Q. Do you still stand by your slogan of exporting Islam?

Yes. Our oil resources belong to all the Muslims of the world. It's their property. We have countries like India and Palestine and Pakistan to help, but the superpowers do not allow us to play a constructive role.

Just look at these 20 months of useless war. It has shattered our economy and paralysed our main industry. We are overwhelmed by severe problems. An economic embargo has been imposed on us. Under these difficult circumstances, however much we sih, we will not be able to help. We have suffered heavily on every count.

CSO: 4600/535

ACCOMPLISHMENTS, PLANS OF CONSTRUCTION JIHAD REVIEWED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 13 Jun 82 p 8

[Interview with 'Ali Reza Afshar, member of Central Council of Construction Jihad; date and place not specified]

[Text]

On the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of Construction Jihad, an organization devoted to building and developing the country after the revolution, we present an interview done with Brother Afshar, a member of the Central Council of Jihad and the statistics of Jihad activities during the past year.

In the Name of God.

Jihad — A Definition: Ali Reza Afshar, a member of the Central Council of the Construction Jihad, gives the following definition of "Jihad": "It is an effort and move in the cause of Allah; it is man's self-sacrtifice and devotion to this cause."

Mr. Afshar asserts the term jihad has a similar meaning and connotation in Islam. The word means, he continues, to give up your life and wealth for the fulfilment of the Almighty's sovereignty on earth.

Regarding the ambiguities existing for foreigners who are not conversant with Islamic culture, in connection with the movement called "Construction Jihad", Mr. Afshar refers to the confession recently made by a Swedish paper on their failure in understanding the movement. As another example, he refers to the surprise shown by the Yugoslav Housing Minister, (in recent meetin g- ween the Imam's representative in the Construction Jihad and the Yoguslav official) over the extent of activities undertaken by the Construction Jihad and the minister's praise of these effor s.

The services rendered by the Construction Jihad can be classified into seven categories:

1) Agricultural activities and livestock breeding.

2). The cultural services which are considered as one of the main activities of the CJ in the villages. These activities include the holding of classes to familiarize lla gers with the culture of the revolution, dis ribution of tapes, posters, books, etc. as well as showing films and setting up of libraries.

3). Rural Councils: The establishment of these councils has been another major task fulfilled by the CJ Construction Jihad. The significance of these councils is that the villagers could see into their own problems and solve them themselves.

4). In development fields, the Construction Jihad has so far built many public baths, schools, mosques, roads and other buildings.

5). The Construction Jihad has further supplied the country's villages with water and electricity as well as with medical care. These services could well play a significant role in the independence of the villages and in encouraging villagers to return to their own hometown and indulge in agricultural activities.

6. The sixth branch of the Jihad's activities deals with industries, including handicrafts. This is important since it offers employment to villagers and prevents further dependence of industries. The Construction Jihad is presently running several mines throughout the country, which is an aid to utilize non-metal underground resources.

7). The last phase of the activities of the Construction Jihad concerns the economy, including giving loans to villagers to strengthen their purchasing ability in rural areas. At the beginning of the implementation of this plan, some 3 billion rials has been the total sum allocated to the Construction Jihad for this purpose, most of which has been given to villagers as loans.

At the present time while Iran is about to put a victorious end to the 21 month old Iraqi imposed war, the Construction Jihad has focused its activities on the recon-

struction of rural war-stricken areas.

In this attempt, all the possibilities and manpower of the Construction Jihad have been organized so that, with the will of God, and the people's mobilization, speedy measures for the renovation of these areas in the war zones will soon begin.

Comparing the Islamic Revolution of Iran with other revolutio s in the world and stressing the role of Construction Jihad in spreading the culture of the revolution and the reconstruction of the ruins caused during the revolution. Mr. Afshan states, "Principally, in a brief comparison between the Islamic Revolution of Iran and other revolutions, the important point is the all-out cooperation of the people and their belief in God as well as their belief in the Islamic Revolution's being a divine one. This has been a major factor that has caused our nation to fulfill whatever it has wished to, and to defeat the greatest obstacles in this way, each of whic could cripple a revolution.

"Despite all the difficulties that our martyrbreeding nation has been faced with, including the economic blockade, the imposed Iraqi war, the wide-spread propaganda of the superpowers through news imperialism, the people have succeeded in taking long steps for the reconstruction of the country, something which has not been witnessed in other revolutions.

"We started our activities with relying least on foreign facilities and instead relied on the power of faith which caused this brilliant success for us. Nevertheless, other revolutions, despite their support for the superpowers, had not been able to achieve this level of output and have failed in successfully handling their internal problems."

In the conclusion of his remarks, Mr. Afshar reiterated that the root of all these successes was in the faith of the people who under the leadership of their great Imam, eagerly endevored in the cause of the revolution.

A Look At The Activities of the Construction Jihad

Activities	Completed	Unfinished
Schools	846	541
Baths	776	497
Mosques	360	229
Clinics	59	32
Houses	326	658
Other Buildings	1,840	421
Water Supply (Villages)	1,134	438
Bridges (various kinds)	1,666	-
Roads (Kms)		
(Asphalted, paved, dirt roads)	5,351.1	-
Ele ricity Supply (Villages)	657	152

Construction Jihad's Activities In Warfronts

Activities	Total
Bunkers	1,970
Embankments	180 (Kms)
Roads	1,262.5 (Kms)
Bridges	216
Helicopter Bands	7
Munitions Caches	18
Other reconstruction services	9
Repairs of Machinery	22,000 (instances)
Transportation	7,850 (instances)
Other technical aid	12 (instances)

The Construction Jihad is providing unique services in providing facilities of all kinds that had been missing from village life. Above is a scene from a rural clinic constructed by this organization.

The Construction Jihad will face its biggest challenge to date in the remaking of war torn Iran.

CSO: 4600/568

BRIEFS

GENEVA PARTICIPATION DENIED--Tehran (IRNA)--Iran will never take part in Geneva talks on the Afghanistan problem, announced a Foreign Ministry spokesman, while stressing Iran's conditions for resolving the Afghanistan problem. He emphasized that Iran will do anything for the realization of such goals. In conclusion, the Foreign Ministry official categorically denied all rumors spread by foreign imperialist news agencies on Iran's alleged participation in those talks as an observor or with any other status. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 7 Jun 82 p 1]

CSO: 4600/547

FINLAND HOLDING LUXURY LINER UNTIL PEACE DECLARED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 3 Jun 82 p 30

[Text] "Al-Mansur" goes into mothballs at Wartsila's Perno shipyard.

The white luxury liner the Iraqi Government has ordered from Wartsila has for the time being been waiting for the war between Iraq and Iran to end.

Practically speaking, the ship, which cost just under 200 million marks, is ready, although it has not yet been turned over to the party that placed the order. On the other hand, Wartsila has already received payment for the job, even though under the terms of ship-construction contracts the last third installment is generally paid on delivery.

"The luxury liner is ready for the owners to come and get it whenever they like," manager P.E. Sundman of Wartsila's Turku shipyard said.

However, they do not yet dare to take the ship into the Persian Gulf because Iraq's only port, in Basra, has been bombed to pieces. The channel of Shatt al-Arab has again been so badly clogged that it is unfit for traffic and clearing it following a possible peace treaty will take months.

"We have reached an agreement with the Iraqis for the ship to remain here for the time being. It will probably be put 'into mothballs' at the Perno shipyard," Sundman said.

Except for the additional storage, the Iraqi-Iranian War has not created any other inconveniences for Wartsila. Iraq was interested in additional purchases from Finland, but because of the fighting they did not get as far as the negotiations stage.

Armored Sides

Dubbed "Al-Mansur," the 121-meter-long liner is "the last word" in shipbuilding. The Iraqi buyers were even so particular that the Arabia logo had to be removed from the toilet bowls.

The ship has a capacity of about 300 passengers. A 60-man crew will see to the comforts of the passengers.

For the safety of the high-ranking passengers, care has been taken to provide the pleasure craft with armored sides and windows with bullet-proof glass. The ship's engines have been mounted on rubber cushions so that the passengers' sleep will not be disturbed at night by the vibrations.

A helicopter pad has been installed on "Al-Mansur's" afterdeck, which certainly will not help in the event of any possible racket inside the ship because passengers can only flee from their luxuriously-appointed cabins to the foredeck through a secret door.

11,466
CSO: 3107/131

OIL DISCOVERY IN AL-AZARAQ REGION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic NO 266, 27 Mar 82 p 15

[Interview with Ahmad Dihqan, vice-president of the Natural Resources Authority by AL-MUSTAQBAL : "Discovery of Oil in Jordan" date and place not specified]

[Text] Ahmad Dihqan, engineer and vice-president of the Natural Resources Authority, said in a private interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL that "indications point to the existence of petroleum in Jordan in the region of al-Azraq." Mr Dihqan said, "Preliminary exploratory drilling, which began at the start of October last year, has been completed. The wells are 3,500 meters deep, and there are evidences of oil at a depth of 2,650 meters. Tests will be conducted to determine the quantity and quality of the oil during the next phase, according to the progress of the established program."

Mr Dihqan added that this evidence bears encouraging signs of the existence of oil in this region, and that the results were obtained by the Natural Resources Authority within the framework of the national petroleum search program.

King Husayn carried out an inspection of the location in which the drilling is taking place in the al-Azraq region, where he himself looked into the progress of the work in the first exploratory well. He also listened to a complete explanation by those responsible for digging the well on the various aspects of the work and its progress. He commended all those involved.

This program is implemented under the 5-year plan which enjoins the necessity of consulting oil searches and orienting ourselves toward self-reliance, after the failure of the policy of granting privileges to foreign companies.

The first stage of this program ended with the end of the first 5-year plan, which included organizational procedures in the framework of the Natural Resources Authority, as well as the completion of the earthquake land survey in the areas where it is hoped there is oil, including the region of al-Azraq. This is in addition to re-evaluating earthquake information gathered previously by the foreign companies.

The second phase began with the second 5-year plan of 1981-1985. It aims to initiate drilling works in the al-Azraq region. Toward this end, funds totalling 30 million Jordanian dinars have been set aside from the present 5-year plan to implement this part of the program. The Authority has also rented a Yugoslavian drill with a depth capacity of 18,000 feet which it used to drill its first new well. It will continue its work in the region in the near future, in order to complete the established program.

9397
CSO: 4404/426

ECONOMIC POLICIES CRITICIZED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 736, 24 Mar 82 p 9

[Editorial: "The Chaos of the Private Economic Policy!"]

[Text] For several years there has been a national demand to reduce Kuwaiti oil production to correspond to our actual needs without the waste that has predominated, or to divert a large part of it in the form of foreign currencies, the prices of which fluctuate according to international economic conditions that are difficult to supervise or control. This demand was regarded as irrational, and its application as absolutely impossible in any way, shape, or form.

Some years later, the government undertook to restrict oil production, after it came to understand the sound thinking of which this demand was based. This request is not made out of any love for requesting a decrease in production as such, or to create an artificial oil crisis. Rather, it was a first and principal step toward planning the national economy, so it would not continue in its present course, since that may have negative repurcussions on the level of the domestic economy, strongly affecting the average citizen, as a result of the economic surplus which has remained for some time, especially after 1973. Due to the almost complete lack of economic investment, this wealth goes basically and primarily into speculation. This speculation has taken over, so that the major volume of activity in the Kuwaiti economy is not even touched by planning. Speculation in everything--paper currency, real estate, or sometimes even nothing, as has been happening recently. The Kuwaiti domestic economy has remained not only without planning, but in the midst of an atmosphere in which it doesn't know where to turn. In this atmosphere, everything began to build on this speculation, including real estate, construction, etc., to the extent that ordinary housing and commercial needs were no longer being met as they were in the sixties, on the very basis of continued speculation due to the new form as a structure for housing or commerce.

This chaotic economy and the construction on the basis of private interests followed chaos in the housing project, to the extent that we no longer know why we have this large number of foreign immigrants. First of all, it resulted from a rational construction and housing policy, and is due to the greatest degree of planning. But now, the process has gotten into a strange phase, that of building for a bigger profit...and so forth....

That was followed by a great increase in the field of services as a whole; streets which could not contain the convoys of automobilies; guaranteed health services in a strange form that does not meet needs; schools; etc. All this is due to the lack of a clear domestic economic policy and the lack of study of the consequences of the methods of previous years, in the midst of a policy of private interests which has dominated the regional economy.

What effect does large government expenditure for these benefits have on the national economy? A simple example: the cost of educating a Kuwaiti student up to secondary school is more than twice that of a student in the United States. This is without comparing costs in other places in the world.

We believe that we are in circumstances produced by oil which began to be a factor on this plane. Some have started to think of what was said long ago, a saying which was sometimes accused of being either "imported ideas" or "extremism." As long as there is no serious stand taken to confront this great problem, we will find ourselves overwhelmed by a crisis which will begin on the level of the citizen of medium and limited income, and could extend to future generations. This is already the case with the housing problem, which still has not been solved for those who have been complaining of it for 14 years, since 1969.

The essence of the request and the urgency with which it is made are therefore clear to us based on the reality of our situation, though it has not become clear to others--or perhaps those parties who pursue the economic policy of private interests do not want this to be clear.

9397
CSO: 4404/426

BRIEFS

NEW WHEAT SEED INTRODUCED--The success of an experiment to grow a new type of local wheat, a large quantity of which has been distributed in different parts of the Jamahiriya for farmers has been announced. The experiment succeeded as the new seeds were adopted to the environment and produced 4,600 tons per hectare. The sources said the new seeds will be planted in large areas in the future. It was named 'Al Mohkhtar' and the next harvest will be coming soon from Al Zahra, Tajoura and other areas. [Text] [Valletta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 12 Jun 82 p 12]

CSO: 4500/205

MINISTER ANALYZES FOURTH PLAN

Main Characteristics

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 29 Apr 82 p 3

[Excerpt] The minister gave CHAAB an exclusive presentation of the plan and the main programs which will be pursued during the plan period in the various sectors of national life.

Today we are publishing the first part of this presentation. It is, among other things, a question in this first part of the basic characteristics of the fourth plan which will henceforth take into account the regrettable failure of those which preceded it and the prospects for the development of the Mauritian economy.

Working on the basis of a rather realistic diagnosis of the Mauritian economy, taking into account the encouraging results of the recovery plan established by the national leadership as of 1979, but also the path remaining to be covered in order to reestablish the major balances in the Mauritanian economy, so harmful to it were the joint effects in the 1979 decade of such natural catastrophes as the drought, the war and certain economic policy errors committed, the fourth plan was designed as a plan for recovery, consolidation and restructuring.

I. The Basic Characteristics of the Fourth Plan

In the course of the period between 1959 and 1980, the base of the national economy has gradually shifted from the primary sector (mines excluded) to the tertiary sector. Thus the rural sector, within which the majority of the population of the country lives, and which accounted for 65 percent of the gross domestic product at market prices in 1959, only accounted for 27 percent in 1980.

The industrial sector which contributed 4 percent to this total in 1959 saw an increase to 37 percent (including 33 percent for the mines) by 1972, dropping, then, to 18 percent in 1980 (including 12 percent for the mines). The contribution of the tertiary sector, on the contrary, increased from 27 percent in 1959 to 46 percent in 1980.

In the same period, the development of the gross domestic product underwent clear variations depending on the period, as the following table shows.

	1959-1963	1964-1969	1969-1973	1976-1979	1959-1979
Gross National Product	+11%	+ 6%	+ 2%	+ 4%	+ 6%
Including:					
Mining sector	--	+10%	+ 1%	-11%	- 1%(1)
Tertiary sector	+11%	+15%	+ 5%	+ 9%	+ 9%
Rural sector	+ 1%	+ 4%	- 6%	+ 5%	+ 2%

(1) Rate for the period 1964-1979.

The DEP calculations were based on data from the BCM [Central Bank of Mauritania], BCEAO [Central Bank of the West African States], IMF and the IBRD. Following very high annual rates of growth between 1959 and 1963, the growth of the gross domestic product slowed substantially between 1969 and 1980, and showed a decline in 1975 (-4 percent), 1977 (-7 percent) and 1978 (-0.2 percent).

On the basis of the first recovery efforts in 1979, the national leadership sought to establish the economic policy choices and the developmental programs resulting therefrom within a long-term perspective, while the preceding plans had been drafted in terms of the needs of the recent assertion of the Mauritanian personality both on the domestic and on the foreign level, which included forging the tools of political sovereignty (establishment of state services, construction of the capital), economic sovereignty (assumption of control of the mining resources by the Mauritanian nation, investments, infrastructure) and cultural sovereignty (strengthening of the educational apparatus). The fourth plan, noting the often ambitious nature of certain goals in the preceding plans, which were not, unfortunately, attained in all cases, was designed to be more realistic and therefore closer to the concerns in the everyday lives of the people of Mauritania. While the preceding plans did not define overall goals and, based on the hypothesis that economic development could only be achieved through concentration in productive sectors by means of investment, promoted, in the final analysis, the "extraversion" of the Mauritanian economy, the fourth plan pursued the development of its own natural resources, first and foremost the human resources, but natural resources as well (agriculture, fishing, mining) as the basic goal. Thus one could call the development of the economy "self-centered," which, without cutting it off from the international economy, which the modern world requires, involves greater concern for its domestic development and, in fact, an increase in production to make it possible to satisfy a demand which has developed greatly. At this price, it was concluded, the balance of public finances in particular could be reestablished, and all of the distortions among the economic sectors, leading to rather sharp disparities from one region and one social category to another, could be corrected.

These distortions, unfortunately, were aggravated by:

--investment allocations heavily oriented toward the mining and service sectors, rather than toward the rural sector, or, when such were made, allocations unsuited to the thinking of the rural population;

--a rather unsuitable approach to the problems of an institutional nature, or involving technical, administrative and human organization, including training;

--a poor understanding of the transfer mechanisms within the rural economy (livestock breeding and crop raising), within the industrial sector, and in the rest of the economy; and

--a decline in exports of iron ore, limited income for the Mauritanian state from maritime resources, and poor control of livestock exports.

We were faced, then, with a deficit, becoming structural, in the budget and the balance of payments. The former was due basically to an operational budget and the financing of investments based essentially on foreign resources. The latter deficit was because of this aggravated thanks to the increasing cost imposed by servicing the debt, the main deficit being created by the increase in imports of food products made necessary by the continuing deterioration of farm production.

In addition to that, population data and figures on the employment situation introduced supplementary and concomitant constraints. The settlement of numerous nomad populations, both in the urban and in the rural zones, because of such disasters as drought and the resulting drying up of wells, led to worrisome concentrations in various urban centers, Nouakchott in particular, weighing heavily on the job situation. This situation has been aggravated by the phenomenon of real or concealed unemployment in the rural sector, and the bottlenecks created by illiteracy and inadequate vocational training.

Added to this concern to operate over the long term, therefore, it is necessary that in the course of the fourth plan, the main goal of which is the maximal increase in the national productive base, the necessary consistency, within this dynamic perspective, be guaranteed in order to correct the serious disparities which can be noted at present.

From a project "catalogue," as one could define the second and third plans (in addition, many investments were carried out outside the plan), we have proceeded, with the fourth plan, to a complex of actions drafted as recently as possible and carried out over entire sectors, with a view to modifying and increasing the productive level of each of these sectors. The desire for consistency, therefore, is basic, from this perspective.

Economic Recovery Strategy

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 30 Apr 82 pp 3, 8

[Text] Today we are carrying a summary of the fourth economic and social development plan which Minister of Economy and Finance Dieng Boubou Farbie has provided to CHAAB on an exclusive basis.

This portion is entitled "Development Strategy--the Prospects." It involves an effort at recovery, the organization of consolidation and development of the economic and productive base.

Let us recall that in the first portion, it was a question of a plain, simple, concise and rather clear-cut definition of the fourth plan.

The plan exists on a general level and on regional sectorial levels. Consistency must be guaranteed among these various levels.

The long-term strategy should allow the nation to control its natural resources to the benefit of the collective, with a resultant greater national independence in the realm of food self-sufficiency and management of the educational, responsible for the development of human resources. In addition to the political and continuing desire of the national leadership, already set forth on a number of occasions, it is support of the strategic choices by the whole of the Mauritanian people which is necessary and indispensable.

The medium-term strategy during the fourth plan is to pursue recover, to establish the conditions for consolidation and to promote restructuring.

a. The pursuit of recovery will be carried out by means of:

--limiting public expenditures;

--establishing a new state policy with regard to the public and semipublic enterprises; and

--reorganization of the public debt.

b. The development of consolidation will be guaranteed through:

--continuation of the projects already under way;

--resumption of the projects set aside during the third plan; and

--orientation toward replacement investments, such as the modernization of technical tools for public enterprises and the maintenance of the iron export capacity.

c. The development of restructuring of the productive economic base of the nation will not depend solely on an orientation of public investments and the precise definition of the role in the economy:

--of the state, which should not have to bear an excessively budget burden because of its involvement in the economy. This involves the abandonment of projects which are not financially and economically justified, a limitation on nonproductive projects, a better definition of the financing plans for new projects, and rigorous management of the public enterprises; and

--the private sector, which should be encouraged and directed toward the productive sectors, which are crop raising and livestock breeding, fishing and a

large part of the modern sector. The establishment of clear and precise rules, absolute observance of them by the parties involved, for the good of the collective, should guarantee that the entrepreneur will fulfill his economic and social function by creating goods and services for which he is fairly compensated.

The surpluses produced could thus be channeled toward more profitable productive activities than in the past and the better use of foreign exchange earned by exports. As an incentive, a framework such as to make individual and collective interests more compatible should be established. This depends on a better understanding and better use of such tools of management as:

--on the enterprise level, an accounting plan, calculation of cost prices, and use of controls;

--on the adminstrative level, a better understanding of budget management and procedural organization; and

--on the general economic level, in the application of economic policy choices (interest rate, development financing mechanisms, restructuring of sectors).

Finally, the reorientation of the educational system toward quantitative and qualitative improvement of vocational training will alleviate the shortage of skilled manpower from which the country is suffering.

B. On the Sector Level:

The strategies are derived from the overall strategy with particular adaptation to each case. Three strategies merit special attention:

--the educational and training sector;

--livestock breeding and crop raising; and

--the fishing sector.

The other sectors represent nonrenewable resources (mining sector) or complementary resources.

a. Educational Sector:

This sector shows a number of distortions in comparison with real economic life and provides the various population strata with rather poor training for their working lives. This aspect, moreover, is as indispensable as providing exposure to our culture or to foreign cultures. In addition, it is characterized by poor internal yield.

As the fourth plan is being launched, we note that the following obstacles continue to exist:

--On the level of basic education, there is no inherent adaptation or preparation of the students for active life. In particular, we do not by any means

have basic education adapted to each environment (crop raising, livestock breeding, fishing, urban concentrations), and no facilities for adult education exist.

--On the secondary education level, the existing selection mechanism poses a major obstacle to the harmonious development of other levels of education. Finally, the still inadequate normal training is hindering the accelerated nationalization of cadres, and is consistent, moreover, with a rapid increase in this type of education.

On the level of technical and vocational training, the limited personnel and development as a function of a single modern sector serves to penalize the technical staffing of the sectors which encourage development the most.

On the level of normal training, certain problems such as training quality and advanced training for teachers still exist to some degree.

Provisions for rediscounting special advances may be contemplated in accordance with article 62 of the Central Bank statutes.

The longer term measures are designed to bring about:

--the improvement of the Mauritanian public;

--a reduction in the interference of certain administrative or political levels in the credit decisions made by banks;

--reduction of the administrative hindrances caused in the normal development of certain banking operations by the weaknesses and irregularities in certain state departments;

--better control of loan amounts allocated, their uses and due dates; and

--measures designed to reduce hoarding in the commercial sector.

C. Investment Financing:

The volume decided upon is 89.2 billion UM [Mauritanian ouguiya]. The following limitations are to be applied:

--the new dept resulting from these projects should limit the service ratio for the export debt to 20 percent;

--the impact of the projects on the state budget should be reduced as much as possible;

--the economy should be in a position to absorb the marginal or structural changes due to these investments; and

--an average rate of 2 percent of the loans over 40 years, with 8 years deferred amortization.

Setting the Guelbs project aside, 31.2 percent of the investments will be allocated to the rural sector, 23.8 percent to the industrial, fishing, mines and energy sectors, 30 percent to the civil infrastructure and 15.1 percent to the social infrastructure and sovereignty.

a. Current State of the Investment Program

Out of a total of 89.2 billion UM, 46.5 billion has already been committed, including 22.7 billion for the Guelbs project. The remaining financing to be allocated to cover the whole of the investment program comes to about 42.7 billion UM.

For the rest, the distribution of these investments as known at the present time is as follows:

Categories	
Investments included in the budget*	4.7
Private investments	10
Investments from foreign funds	51.8
Guelbs project	22.7
	89.2

*The maintenance of the percentage of budget allocations for investment at 5.3 percent of the budget total has been approved for the plan period.

Agricultural, Fishing Development

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 5 May 82 pp 3, 6

[Text] In an exclusive interview, Mr Dieng Boubou Farbie has commented on the fourth economic and social development plan for you, the readers of CHAAB. We have provided you with the first two parts of this plan, entitled "Development Strategies and Perspectives."

The following is the portion pertaining to the rural and fishing sectors.

The Rural Sector

The five main agroecological zones in the country offer a varied potential--a rainy cultivation zone, a wadi subsidence cultivation zone, a palm-growing zone and a pasturage zone. But taken as a whole, the situation of the rural sector remains a concern: livestock herds decimated by the drought, leading to an exodus to the urban centers; a deteriorating environment; inadequate investments made in the course of the preceding plans; institutional and structural weaknesses. All of this has contributed to a decline in the traditional farm production, that of grain in particular (-50 percent), and to the weakening of animal production, clandestine exports of which, in addition, represent a burden on the balance of payments. Only date production has remained stable.

The main goals established for this sector--self-sufficiency in food, regeneration of the environment, retention of the people on their native land--can only be achieved on the following conditions:

--for the first goal, a long-term effort involving the development of irrigated cultivation, reestablishment of the herds and the organization of specific campaigns such as the development of poultry production and the encouragement of fish consumption;

--for the second, campaigns for environmental rehabilitation, village reaforestation, and prevention of the breakdown of the infrastructure; and

--for the third, the improvement of living conditions in the rural sector and increasing the income of the peasant masses.

The development strategy adopted based on the priority exploitation of national resources will place emphasis first of all on projects of a participational nature and those involving the lowest possible recurrent costs. It appears that water and soil resources are not the limiting factor. On the other hand, it is necessary, if success is to be achieved, to resolve a certain number of legal problems (real estate, forest and water legislation).

Crop raising subsector: In a normal rainfall year, between 182,000 and 230,000 hectares are cultivated. The total for 1980 was only 121,000 hectares, with a production yield of 41,000 tons of grain. Three regions--Brakna, Gorgol and Guidimakha--produced three-quarters of this quantity. The irrigated cultivation of rice plays only a modest role (11,000 tons on 3,400 hectares). Yields come to about 4 tons of paddy rice per hectare.

Taking the limited contribution of this sector to the gross national product (less than 3 percent), two general policy axes were established:

--increased food production; and

--development of products to replace imports.

Each agroecological zone has been given statistical goals consistent with increases in areas cultivated or tonnages which may reach 50 percent or even 100 percent over 5 years.

Livestock breeding subsector: Between 3.4 and 3.6 million head of tropical livestock are scattered over the 15 million hectares of Mauritanian pastureland. Mauritania is no longer, taking its clandestine exports (16,000 tons per year) into account, in a position to meet its own needs. Domestically consumed production is 44,000 tons per year, while the need is 48,000 tons per year. The orientation must be toward reestablishing the livestock herds, increasing herd production and lightening the financial burden on the state by encouraging livestock breeders to share in the costs.

To achieve this, it is necessary to deal with the obstacles to achieving these three goals, taking weather conditions into account. It will be necessary to wage prophylactic campaigns against the major epizootic diseases and to group livestock breeders on the basis of complementary activities (fire protection, maintenance of water sources, complementary feeding). An effort will then be made to increase the exploitation rate for large animals from 10 to 15 percent by increasing the rate of reproduction. Campaigns pursued by the state and the strengthening of staffing services will also be undertaken. All of these activities will extend beyond the fourth plan.

Environmental protection subsector: Excessive and uncontrolled cutting of timber for the use of wood as a fuel entails the likelihood that 5 to 10 years from now, the 127,000 hectares of classified forest will have disappeared. The establishment of structures to combat the conversion of the land to desert is urgently needed.

Maritime fishing subsector: Campaigns to increase production to a substantial level, whereas it has now become marginal, include:

--stocking of the riverbasin and reservoirs;

--development of river holes for raising fish; and

--rationalization of fishing equipment and methods.

C. Maritime Fishing

Maritime fishing, which involves both industrial operations in which foreign influence is great and traditional fishing, characterized by its scattered and disorganized nature, is carried over an exclusive economic zone (ZEE) which is relatively rich (525 km of coastline and 36,000 square km of continental shelf).

The estimated annual resources of 680,000 tons of various fish have been administered over the course of time in various ways:

--First of all, the fishing license policy granting permission to fish for a minimal fee, which has led to the plundering of this asset, without any substantial contribution to the budget;

--Subsequently, a new fishing policy defined at the end of 1979, reflected on the fiscal level by the introduction of export fishing rights, imposing an obligation on foreign partners to join with citizens in order to produce, unload, process and market their catches. Eleven mixed economic companies have been established since 1979, involving an investment program (185 million U.S. dollars) consistent with the following capacity:

freezing on land--183 tons per year
fish storage--31,600 tons per year
ice production--91 tons per year
fish meal and oil--78,000 tons per year.

In 1981, 292 fishing vessels operated in the exclusive economic zone, obtaining a catch estimated at 730,000 tons, representing 18.7 billion ouguiyas (excluding illegal income).

Now the state budget, which should have received 2.8 billion UM therefrom, received only 1.1 billion. Licenses accounted for 0.7 billion UM.

The application of the new policy, following the elimination of the licensing policy, has led to results which did not measure up to expectations, because:

--authorizations to fish were given to the heavy-tonnage freezer trawlers which market their catch in Las Palmas;

--other authorizations were granted to large companies on condition that they establish processing facilities in Nouadhibou, a profitable operation; and

--few control measures exist.

Therefore plans include:

--the integrated development of purely domestic and modern (traditional) fishing;

--the development of the domestic fish market;

--the creation of jobs and income in the fishing industry;

--the creation of mixed enterprises for marketing based in Mauritania;

--increasing state income by the strengthening of recovery methods; and

--supplying the plants established in Nouadhibou.

The fourth plan will include an effort to follow these guidelines by proposing measures and updated elements in the new 1979 policy by redeploying the investment potential, cooperation with carefully chosen partners, gradual and cautious elimination of fishing licenses, the establishment of the services and commodities essential for a great fishing port in Nouadhibou, and the establishment of a minimum guarantee.

The development of traditional fishing will be designed to guarantee greater profitability for this activity. Thus traditional and industrial fishing will permit the creation of 3,000 jobs. In addition to a certain number of investments, complementary measures such as the establishment of a national fishing bureau and vocational training activities and the strengthening of control will make improved mastery of this national resource possible.

Plan Implementation

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 7 May 82 p 3

[Text] The success of the fourth economic and social development plan depends on each Mauritanian citizen living within or outside the national territory. It

also depends on the total mastery of our human potential, our national resources and our potential. It also represents a prerequisite for the survival of the Mauritanian nation.

This, in brief, is what can be concluded from the exclusive explanation given to CHAAB by Mr Dieng Boubou Farbie concerning the fourth economic and social development plan. Today we are providing the readers with the portion entitled "The Actions Planned."

III. The Actions Planned

A. Balancing Public Finances and the Balance of Payments

The plans in this connection, made difficult by the uncertainty of the international environment and a certain lack of reliability in our domestic economic data, better mastery of which will be possible in the future thanks to the statistical apparatus being set up, on the basis of certain hypotheses. The main ones are a 3 percent increase in the administrative wage volume in real terms, increased of between 2 and 12 percent in the production of economic sectors (crop raising, fishing, livestock breeding, mining), increases in tax and customs income (from 3.5 to 22 percent for fish export duties), rigorous maintenance of government transfers and subsidies, and a 10-percent annual increase in prices.

a. Budget: Within this context, the annual budget will be maintained at the current level (3.3 billion UM), and the cumulative deficit (from 1981 to 1985) will be 14.5 billion UM.

More restrictive hypotheses enable us to contemplate a budgetary balance:

--in 1983 (reduction of the wage volume by 5 percent), with a cumulative balance of 1.1 billion UM for the period; and

--in 1985 (maintenance of the administrative wage volume), with a cumulative deficit of 2.7 billion UM for the period.

Whatever the case, the effort to be made should be oriented toward:

--the reallocation of resources through the stabilization of certain expenditures and the gradual increase of others;

--granting priority to investment expenditures over operational expenditures; and

--increasing current income, more in terms of an expansion of the tax base than an increase in collection rates, along with simultaneous strengthening of tax controls.

The possible participation of the international community in the financing of the remainder of the budget deficit which the domestic effort has been unable to cover should be workable within a context of structural adaptation. Domestic

efforts to organize the public and parapublic sectors and better management thereof should have as an urgent counterpart the orientation of foreign resources toward directly productive activities or support of directly productive activities.

The elimination of the budget deficit could be achieved very rapidly provided that vigorous voluntary action supported by all is undertaken. The calculations made and quoted above, which are but mere projections, justify this belief.

b. Payments Balance and Public Debt

Given the same hypotheses, the current account category in the balance of payments continues to show a deficit. Efforts could be focused:

--on import categories such as food and consumer goods and raw materials not essential to the development of the priority sectors; and

--on export categories such as:

--iron for the rapid development of investments in mine replacement (Guelbs project);

--livestock, for which there is not accurate accounting because of the laxity of the frontiers; and

--fish, for which stricter accounting is necessary.

At the same time, a limitation on the debt service to 20 percent by means of a judicious choice of loans for the financing of projects out of foreign resources has been proposed.

B. Credit and Monetary Action

The expansion of domestic credit since 1973 has led to a situation of blockage which is a heavy burden on the profitability of the banks which have borrowed heavily abroad.

Urgent measures should be planned to reestablish the liquidity of the banking system and should, among other things, involve a state effort to reduce its indebtedness to public enterprises, since their debts to banks represent a large part of the frozen credit.

b. Projects by Sector

The priority given to rural development is characterized by a heavy percentage of investments in this sector (31.1 percent), and by the fact that a substantial part of the civil infrastructure expenditures will be for roads, making it possible to provide outlets for farming regions.

D. Recommendations of the Synthesis Commission

After studying and approving the overall strategy for economic and social development, the synthesis commission formulated a certain number of recommendations designed to strengthen the suggestions included in the plan and to make them operational on the practical level.

They involve the following sectors:

--development of the territory and the creation of regional development poles;

--elimination of the regional disparities in the realm of education, and development of vocational training and national cultures;

--hierarchic organization of health activities, in which the basic effort should be preventive;

--water resources, for which the people should be responsible, while at the same using new techniques (such as wind energy, for example);

--urban development, within which the strengthening of national services and the development of local materials will be sought;

--rural development, with activities undertaken to strengthen production, to eliminate regional disparities, to resolve the land ownership problem and create an institute of agronomy, and to resolve the problems involved in supply in terms of transport of production;

--farm prices;

--marketing;

--farm credit;

--the development of management methods and flexibility of the private sort through the establishment of a craftwork center.

Category	Cost for the Period	With Guelbs Project	Without Guelbs Project
1. Rural Development	20,670	23.2%	31.1%
2. Industry, Fishing, Mining and Energy	38,568	43.2%	23.8%
3. Civil Infrastructures	19,899	22.3%	30 %
4. Social Infrastructure and National Sovereignty	10,068	11.3%	15.1%
5. Total	89,205	100 %	100 %

5157
CSO: 4519/193

BRIEFS

OIL EXPORTS--Shaykh Sultan al-Kasemi, governor of al-Shariqah and member of the higher council for the Emirates, announced that the first export shipment from the inland oil wells will have been completed by 15 May. Shaykh al-Kasemi stated last week in a meeting held by the society of oil engineers that the natural gas produced from wells will be utilized to generate the powerplant in the Emirates. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA-AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 256, 28 Mar - 4 Apr 82 p 21] 9770

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